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1. Introduction
Growing firms have a strong incentive to hold large amounts of cash to support 
investment opportunities because external financing is too costly for these firms due 
to the high degree of information asymmetry, especially in emerging markets (Mueller, 
2006). The shareholders in these ﬁrms thus face a tradeoﬀ between losing high-return 
opportunities if the ﬁrms pay out too much cash and suﬀering the agency problem of 
excess cash holdings if they retain too much cash. Agency theory thus suggests that 
effective corporate governance mechanisms provide investors in growing firms with 
better protection, meaning the shareholders in these ﬁrms will accept a higher level of 
cash holdings (Chen, 2008) and a lower level of cash dividends. For instance, Pinkowitz, 
Stulz, and Williamson (2006) ﬁnd that investors place less value on the liquid assets and 
more value on the cash dividends of ﬁrms in countries with poor investor protection. 
In the past two decades, China has demonstrated itself to be among the fastest 
growing economies in the world, and thus has attracted a great deal of attention from 
academic researchers and practitioners. Many listed firms experienced a high-growth 
stage during this 20-year period and raised a substantial amount of funds from capital 
markets to fund their projects. Even though these ﬁrms pay out a high level of cash 
dividends, active fund raising from the capital markets provides them with a high 
level of cash holdings. According to the agency theory-based literature (eg, Chen, 
2008), the acceptance of large cash holdings in these ﬁrms depends on the quality of 
investor protection. A common proxy for such protection is insider ownership (Opler 
et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Chen, 2008). Studies 
applying such a proxy indicate that a higher level of insider ownership represents better 
shareholder protection, because the interests of insiders are better aligned with those of 
outside shareholders when insiders own a certain percentage of the company (eg, 5% in 
Opler et al. [1999]). However, this proxy for shareholder protection may not be suitable 
for Chinese listed ﬁrms due to their diﬀerent ownership structure.
Most listed firms in China were originally state-owned enterprises (SOEs). These 
ﬁrms were privatized in a partial-share-issuing fashion to maintain state control while 
raising funds to improve the ﬁnancial position of unproﬁtable SOEs. Because of this 
state control, the performance of Chinese firms is often negatively associated with 
ownership concentration or state ownership (Qi, Wu, and Zhang, 2000; Chen, 2001; 
Wei, Xie, and Zhang, 2005), although such control sometimes oﬀers these ﬁrms certain 
preferential beneﬁts, such as easy access to external funds (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2005; 
Wang, Wong, and Xia, 2008). Given the evidence of the negative consequences of state 
control, however, the interests of the shareholders in Chinese ﬁrms with a higher degree 
of ownership control may be less protected. Accordingly, the free cash ﬂow hypothesis 
of agency theory suggests that shareholders prefer more cash dividends and less cash 
holdings in ﬁrms in which ownership is highly concentrated. However, there is also a 
body of literature arguing that greater cash payouts provide evidence to support the 
tunneling hypothesis, because state-controlled shares are generally non-tradable and thus 
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cannot realize any capital appreciation from the markets (Lee and Xiao, 2004; Chen, 
Jian, and Xu, 2009). Tunneling company assets via large cash payouts thus allows the 
state to ease the ﬁnancial constraints of poorly performing SOEs.  
The aim of this study is to resolve the dispute between proponents of these two 
competing hypotheses by first identifying the problems of both in explaining cash 
holdings and cash dividends in Chinese listed ﬁrms, and then investigating the value of 
these holdings and dividends in ﬁrms with a high and low degree of ownership control 
and in those with a high and low probability of asset expropriation.
In China, cash dividends are required from ﬁrms intending to raise funds through 
equity after their initial offerings (Lee and Xiao, 2004; Chen, Jian, and Xu, 2009). 
Some studies have found that state-controlled ﬁrms and those with a higher ownership 
concentration are likely to pay out a higher level of cash dividends and, consequently, 
greater rights oﬀerings (Lee and Xiao, 2004; Lin et al., 2010). That is, although these 
firms consistently pay out substantial cash dividends, they do not necessarily face 
ﬁnancial constraints because of their access to external ﬁnancing. Thus, these ﬁrms may 
maintain large cash holdings while paying out large cash dividends. This argument is 
diﬀerent in nature from the free cash ﬂow hypothesis, which posits cash payouts as a 
means of reducing the agency problem of excess cash holdings. 
This study contends that the positive relationship between state ownership or 
ownership concentration and cash dividends does not necessarily indicate that 
controlling shareholders appropriate private benefits through a high level of cash 
dividends. Although the controlling shareholders (often the state or a state agency) of 
listed ﬁrms have the incentive to extract more liquid assets from these ﬁrms (Jian and 
Wong, 2010), other investors (including the holders of tradable shares) receive the same 
level of cash dividends as do controlling shareholders. In addition, other tunneling 
methods such as related party transactions provide controlling shareholders with better 
access to valuable company assets and the more eﬀective appropriation of private beneﬁts 
(Jian and Wong, 2010). Another argument against the tunneling hypothesis is that state 
control may not always have a negative inﬂuence on ﬁrms, as the state sometimes oﬀers 
special support to certain strategic industries (Mueller, 2006). 
Hence, to distinguish the free cash ﬂow hypothesis from the tunneling hypothesis 
in explaining the dividend policy of Chinese listed firms, this study investigates 
the association between ownership control and the value of cash holdings and cash 
dividends. If the free cash ﬂow hypothesis dominates (as it does in Pinkowitz et al. [2006] 
and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith [2007]), then investors will place a higher value on 
the dividends, and a lower value on the cash holdings, of ﬁrms with a higher degree of 
ownership control than those of ﬁrms with a lower degree of such control. If, in contrast, 
the tunneling hypothesis dominates (as it does in Lee and Xiao [2004] and Chen et 
al. [2009]), then the value of dividends and cash holdings will be less in ﬁrms with a 
higher degree of ownership control than in ﬁrms with a lower degree of such control. 
According to the free cash ﬂow hypothesis, the value of dividends should be higher in 
ﬁrms with greater ownership control and fewer investment opportunities, which implies 
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a greater likelihood of expropriation. An interesting question is whether the dominance 
of either hypothesis is related to the ﬁrm’s growth stages. Accordingly, this study further 
investigates the dominance of the two hypotheses in firms with different types of 
investment opportunities and ownership structures.
The study examines these research issues in a sample of Chinese listed ﬁrms from 
1998 to 2006. The empirical evidence obtained shows that investors value both cash 
dividends and cash holdings more highly in ﬁrms with a low degree of ownership control 
relative to those with a high degree of such control, which appears to be more consistent 
with the tunneling than the free cash flow hypothesis. However, when investment 
opportunities are taken into account, the latter hypothesis holds greater explanatory 
power in ﬁrms with fewer investment opportunities; that is, investors place greater value 
on the cash dividends of ﬁrms with fewer investment opportunities and a high degree 
of ownership control than they do on those of ﬁrms with fewer such opportunities and 
less ownership control. Interestingly, investors tend to value the cash dividends of ﬁrms 
with more investment opportunities and less ownership control more highly than they 
do on those of ﬁrms with more investment opportunities and greater ownership control. 
This ﬁnding may be related to the special nature of the Chinese market, in which ﬁrms 
are required to pay out dividends to raise capital from markets. In other words, investors 
believe that ﬁrms with less ownership control and more investment opportunities have 
a lower probability of expropriation and truly need funds to support future investment 
projects; hence, these ﬁrms have brighter prospects.
This study contributes to the literature of both agency theory and international 
corporate governance. By investigating the value of cash holdings and cash dividends 
for ﬁrms with high and low degree of ownership control, it aims to resolve the debate 
surrounding the role played by cash dividends in asset expropriation by the controlling 
shareholders of Chinese listed ﬁrms. The ﬁndings of this study show that dividends are 
the major means by which the controlling shareholders of state-controlled ﬁrms extract 
company assets for their own private beneﬁt. The study also contributes to the literature 
of cash holdings and corporate governance. In a rapidly growing economy, Chinese 
listed ﬁrms have a high level of capital demand to support their growth, and the most 
essential determinant of whether these ﬁrms can maintain a high level of cash holdings is 
the quality of investor protection. The results of this study consistently support the free 
cash ﬂow hypothesis of agency theory in explaining the cash holdings and cash dividend 
payouts of Chinese listed ﬁrms with few growth opportunities. This study also serves as 
an example of the applicability of Anglo-Saxon theory to emerging markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section reviews 
the literature related to cash, dividends, and shareholder protection, and develops the 
study’s hypotheses. The next section ﬁrst describes the data set and sample selection and 
then discusses the methodology employed and defines the variables. The paper then 
proceeds to a discussion of the empirical evidence on the value of cash holdings and cash 
dividends in ﬁrms with and without a high degree of ownership concentration and with 
and without good investment opportunities. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.
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2. Cash Holdings, Dividends, and Shareholder Protection
The free cash flow hypothesis of agency theory suggests that a high level of cash 
holdings increases managerial discretion and provides managers with the incentive to 
engage in expropriation for their own private beneﬁt. Papaioannou et al. (1992) suggest 
that managers tend to retain more cash as a privilege, and Myers and Rajan (1998) argue 
that they can obtain more private beneﬁts from liquid assets. Opler et al. (1999) also 
document managers’ preference for the control that comes with holding cash rather than 
paying dividends to stockholders. When ﬁrms have limited investment opportunities, 
retaining a high level of cash increases the likelihood of asset expropriation by managers 
because excess cash may effectively force them to overinvest, thereby damaging the 
interests of shareholders (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Dittmar et al., 2003). Paying 
dividends decreases both cash holdings and the agency cost of overinvestment (Jensen, 
Solberg, and Zorn, 1992; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007). 
Nevertheless, holding a high level of cash is essential to ﬁrms with strong growth 
opportunities, because the greater business risks they face make them subject to higher 
external financing costs (Mueller, 2006). Consequently, rapidly growing firms have 
the incentive to retain large cash holdings, which leads to a trade-oﬀ situation for their 
shareholders, that is, a tradeoff between losing high-return investment opportunities 
if the ﬁrms experience a shortage in funds due to cash payouts and facing the agency 
problem of excess cash holdings if they retain almost their cash. Whether a fast-
growing firm should retain most of its cash from shareholders depends on how well 
company assets and shareholder interests are protected (Chen, 2008). A ﬁrm with better 
shareholder protection mechanisms should retain a high level of cash to meet the capital 
demand of investment opportunities. 
In ﬁrms with a diverse ownership structure, greater insider ownership indicates better 
shareholder protection (eg greater than 5% such ownership in Opler et al. [1999]), 
and it is less likely that these ﬁrms will hold excess cash (Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and 
Ozkan, 2004). In firms with a concentrated ownership structure, however, a higher 
degree of ownership may not necessarily indicate better shareholder protection. Instead, 
the agency problem in these ﬁrms is mostly attributed to the conﬂict of interest between 
controlling and minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999, 2000). When outside 
shareholders are less protected, insiders are more likely to appropriate company assets 
for their own private beneﬁt, thus reducing the value of cash holdings and boosting the 
value of cash dividends (Pinkowitz et al., 2006). 
The majority of Chinese listed ﬁrms are former SOEs. The major purpose of public 
listing the firms was to raise funds to improve the financial position of unprofitable 
SOEs. To be able to impose state policies on ﬁrms’ decision making after their public 
oﬀerings, the state retained a controlling stake in most of China’s listed ﬁrms, and it 
restricts the trading of the majority of their shares on the country’s stock exchanges. 
Furthermore, as the controlling shareholder, the state often has multiple and conﬂicting 
objectives. On one hand, it demands that the ﬁrms it controls become as competitive 
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and eﬃcient as privately owned enterprises, but on the other hand, it may impose the 
burden of social welfare on these ﬁrms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Boycko, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1996; Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski, 1999), and thus they may 
not always be capable of operating as eﬃciently as other ﬁrms. Accordingly, the interests 
of minority shareholders are less likely to be given the highest priority. The negative 
relationship between state control or state ownership and firm value found in prior 
studies (Qi et al., 2000; Chen, 2001; Wei et al., 2005) suggests that such control or 
ownership has a negative impact on shareholder protection. 
Hence, the free cash ﬂow hypothesis, which suggests the positive eﬀect of insider 
ownership on dividends, may not always be applicable in firms with a high level of 
ownership concentration, such as Chinese listed ﬁrms. A number of recent studies have 
thus proposed the tunneling hypothesis to explain the corporate dividend policies of 
Chinese listed ﬁrms (Lee and Xiao, 2004; Chen et al., 2009). These researchers argue 
that, because the holders of non-tradable shares are unable to realize capital gains from 
the markets, these investors (primarily the state and state agencies) will ask for high 
dividend payouts to meet their capital needs in supporting other SOEs. They have 
found that greater state ownership or more concentrated ownership leads to a higher 
level of cash dividends, a ﬁnding they argue provides evidence of the expropriation of 
minority shareholders on the part of controlling shareholders. If the state indeed uses 
cash dividends to extract company assets to support unproﬁtable SOEs, then these may 
lose good investment opportunities due to a lack of funds. As a result, the ﬁrms’ payout 
policy will be reﬂected in their lower market valuation by investors. Hence, if a high 
level of cash payouts constitutes a means of asset tunneling, then investors will value the 
dividends of ﬁrms with a higher degree of ownership control less highly than those of 
ﬁrms with a lower degree of such control.
The tunneling hypothesis does have limitations, however, especially when firms 
have good growth potential. Gul (1999) ﬁnds that investment opportunity is negatively 
associated with dividend payments in China. Lin et al. (2010) find an insignificant 
relationship between both ownership concentration and cash dividend preferences and 
state ownership and such preferences in fast-growing ﬁrms. In addition, Jian and Wong 
(2010) further ﬁnd that group-controlled ﬁrms in China are more likely to manipulate 
earnings and tunnel company assets via related party transactions. Therefore, the 
relationship between ownership concentration and the value of cash dividends may be 
positive or negative, depending on the relative explanatory power of the free cash ﬂow 
and tunneling hypotheses.
H1: If the free cash ﬂow (tunneling) hypothesis is dominant in explaining cash dividends, 
investors place a higher (lower) value on the cash dividends of ﬁrms with higher ownership 
control than of ﬁrms with lower ownership control.
As previously stated, cash holdings provide mangers with greater opportunity to 
expropriate minority shareholders if they wish to do so, because turning such liquid 
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assets into private benefits is less costly than transferring other assets (Myers and 
Rajan, 1998). Shareholders should thus be concerned about the likelihood of being 
expropriated by controlling shareholders when ﬁrms have a high level of cash holdings, 
especially in a market with limited investor protection. In China, investors in tradable 
shares are less likely to inﬂuence company insiders in their decision-making relative to 
other countries, particularly when corporate ownership is highly concentrated. In ﬁrms 
in which investors’ interests are not taken into account in the decision-making process, 
investors bear greater investment risk and thus place a lower value on the ﬁrms. 
Firms with concentrated ownership have been found to have a higher degree of 
interest dispersion between large shareholders and minority shareholders, and the 
controlling shareholders of these ﬁrms are likely to pursue private beneﬁts at the expense 
of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2000). Holding a large 
amount of cash is a good example of asset expropriation (Pinkowitz, 2006). Chinese 
ﬁrms not only have a high degree of ownership concentration, but they are also likely 
to be controlled by the state or by state agencies. In addition, the special characteristics 
of the ownership structure of Chinese firms lead to more asset tunneling. Cash 
assets provide controlling shareholders with a good channel for asset expropriation. 
Accordingly, when ﬁrms experience a higher degree of ownership control, shareholder 
interests are less likely to be protected. Shareholders thus prefer ﬁrms to retain fewer cash 
holdings.
H2: Investors value the cash holdings of ﬁrms with greater ownership control less highly 
than those of ﬁrms with less ownership control.
3. Empirical Design and Data
To examine the association between ownership control and the value of cash 
holdings, this study adopts the model speciﬁcations of Faulkender and Wang (2006), 
which are derived from the valuation model of Fama and French (1998). The regression 
speciﬁcation for this study is as follows.
where r is the stock return of ﬁrm i during ﬁscal year t; R is stock i’s benchmark return 
in year t, and thus r – R represents the excess return of ﬁrm i in year t; ΔC is the change 
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in cash holdings; ΔE is the change in earnings before interest and tax plus interest; ΔNA 
is the change in total assets net of cash and cash equivalents; ΔI is the change in interest 
expenses; ΔD is the change in total cash dividends paid in a given year; C is the sum of 
cash and cash equivalents; Lev is leverage at the year end; and NF is net ﬁnancing in the 
year. The interaction terms between the lag of the level of cash holdings and the change 
in cash holdings, and those between market leverage and the change in cash holdings, 
are also included in equation (1). All variables are deﬂated by the market value of equity, 
calculated as the sum of the market value of tradable shares and 30% of the stock price 
multiplied by the number of non-tradable shares at the beginning of year t to control 
for heteroskedasticity. Chen and Xiong (2001) find the value of non-tradable shares 
to be about 30% of tradable shares, and thus this study uses 30% of the stock price to 
determine the market value of non-tradable shares. The diﬀerences between the model 
adopted in this study and Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) model are that research and 
development expenses are not included in the former, as there are diﬀerences in these 
expenses among Chinese listed ﬁrms, and the former includes stock dividend as a control 
variable. 
This regression model is applied to firms with high and low degree of ownership 
control using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method, and the coefficients of cash 
dividends and the change in cash holdings are then contrasted between the two sample 
groups by estimating the t-statistics of the coeﬃcient diﬀerence in their independent 
variables. If the free cash flow hypothesis is dominant, then ß5 will be higher; if, in 
contrast, the tunneling hypothesis is dominant, then ß5 will be smaller for ﬁrms with 
greater ownership control. 
This study adopts three proxies of ownership control. The first is the change in 
ownership concentration of the five largest investors, as measured by the Herfindahl 
Index (ΔH5). If ΔH5 is positive, then a value of 1 is assigned to the dummy variable 
ΔH5D, thus indicating a higher degree of ownership concentration and, accordingly, 
a higher probability of expropriation, and 0 otherwise. The second is private ultimate 
control (Private), which equals 1 if the firm is ultimately controlled by private or 
institutional investors, and 0 otherwise. Finally, the third proxy is state ultimate control 
(State), which equals 1 if the ﬁrm’s ultimate controller is the state, and 0 otherwise.
The sources of data for the study include the database of the China Center for 
Economic Research in Peking University, which is published by Sinofin Information 
Service Ltd., and company financial statements collected from the websites of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The sample covers all ﬁrms listed on these 
exchanges from 1998 to 2006. After eliminating ﬁrms with missing values for the key 
variables, the ﬁnal sample comprises 8,487 ﬁrm-year observations. Table 1 shows the 
descriptive statistics of the key variables and some of the characteristics of Chinese listed 
ﬁrms.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics of the key variables. ExcessReturn is the stock return of a ﬁrm less its benchmark 
return; ΔC is the change in cash holdings; ΔD is the change in cash dividends; ΔE is the change in earnings before 
interest and taxes plus interest; ΔNA is the change in total assets net of cash and cash equivalents; ΔI is the change 
in interest expenses; LagC is the level of cash holdings at the beginning of the year; StockD is stock dividends; Lev is 
leverage; NF is net ﬁnancing in the year; CA is the ratio of cash to assets; ΔH5 is the change in ownership control; 
ΔH5D is the indicator variable for the change in ownership control, with 1 is assigned for a positive change; Q is 
the market-to-book ratio of assets; and State is an indicator variable for state ownership, with 1 is assigned for state 
ultimate control. All variables are deﬂated by the market value of beginning equity to control for heteroskedasticity.
Panel A: Full sample 
N Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Q3 Median Q1
ExcessReturn 8,487 0.000 0.411 0.126 -0.016 -0.160 
ΔC 8,487 0.011 0.167 0.054 0.001 -0.043 
ΔD 8,487 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ΔE 8,487 0.016 0.236 0.027 0.004 -0.013 
ΔNA 8,487 0.139 0.494 0.238 0.080 -0.015 
ΔI 8,487 0.003 0.020 0.007 0.001 -0.002 
LagC 8,487 0.227 0.232 0.299 0.160 0.079 
StockD 8,487 0.002 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lev 8,487 0.246 0.187 0.373 0.212 0.094 
NF 8,487 0.094 0.462 0.192 0.50 -0.025
CA 8,487 0.153 0.114 0.209 0.127 0.071
ΔH5 8,487 -0.015 0.046 0.000 0.000 -0.006
ΔH5D 8,487 0.285 0.452 1.000 0.000 0.000
Q 8,487 1.515 22.916 1.339 1.008 0.832
State 8,487 0.738 0.440 1.000 1.000 0.000
Panel B: Firms with or without private ultimate control and the p-value of the Wilcoxon two-sample test
Private Ultimate Control 
(Private = 1)
(N=1,820)
Non-Private Ultimate Control 
(Private = 0)
(N=6,667)
p-value of 
Wilcoxon test 
(2)>(1)
Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Median (1)  Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Median (2)
ExcessReturn 0.013 0.479 -0.003 -0.004 0.390 -0.018 0.1364 
ΔC -0.002 0.186 -0.001 0.014 0.162 0.003 0.0015 
ΔD -0.001 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.0435 
ΔE 0.024 0.377 0.006 0.014 0.179 0.004 0.2246 
ΔNA 0.124 0.635 0.084 0.143 0.448 0.079 0.6514 
ΔI 0.003 0.027 0.002 0.003 0.018 0.001 0.0001 
LagC 0.237 0.248 0.159 0.224 0.228 0.161 0.2265 
StockD 0.003 0.015 0.000 0.002 0.011 0.000 0.5342 
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Private Ultimate Control 
(Private = 1)
(N=1,820)
Non-Private Ultimate Control 
(Private = 0)
(N=6,667)
p-value of 
Wilcoxon test 
(2)>(1)
Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Median (1)  Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Median (2)
Lev 0.280 0.193 0.256 0.237 0.185 0.199 0.0001 
NF 0.054 0.588 0.047 0.105 0.421 0.051 0.0063 
CA 0.144 0.121 0.112 0.156 0.112 0.130 0.0001 
ΔH5 -0.013 0.047 0.000 -0.015 0.046 0.000 0.1392 
ΔH5D 0.235 0.424 0.000 0.299 0.458 0.000 0.0001 
Q 2.624 49.405 1.443 1.212 1.420 1.313 0.0001 
Panel C: Firms with or without state ultimate control and the p-value of the Wilcoxon two-sample test
Non-State Ultimate Control 
(State = 0)
(N=2,225)
State Ultimate Control 
(State = 1)
(N=6,262)
p-value of 
Wilcoxon test 
(2)>(1)
Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Median (1)  Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Median (2)
ExcessReturn 0.003 0.453 -0.011 -0.001 0.395 -0.017 0.8654 
ΔC 0.000 0.176 -0.001 0.014 0.164 0.003 0.0034 
ΔD -0.001 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.0347 
ΔE 0.021 0.345 0.004 0.014 0.182 0.004 0.8040 
ΔNA 0.121 0.586 0.083 0.146 0.457 0.079 0.8366 
ΔI 0.003 0.025 0.002 0.003 0.018 0.001 0.0001 
LagC 0.229 0.237 0.152 0.227 0.231 0.162 0.0037 
StockD 0.003 0.014 0.000 0.002 0.011 0.000 0.0381 
Lev 0.265 0.190 0.235 0.240 0.186 0.201 0.0001 
NF 0.065 0.564 0.050 0.104 0.420 0.050 0.0811 
CA 0.148 0.120 0.120 0.155 0.112 0.130 0.0001
ΔH5 -0.013 0.045 0.000 -0.015 0.046 0.000 0.3123 
ΔH5D 0.241 0.428 0.000 0.301 0.459 0.000 0.0001 
Q 2.459 44.713 1.057 1.179 1.075 1.296 0.0001 
Panel D: Firms with a lower or higher degree of ownership control and the p-value of the  
              Wilcoxon two-sample test
Decreased Ownership Concentration 
(ΔH5D = 0)
(N=6,067)
Increased Ownership Concentration 
(ΔH5D = 1)
(N=2,420)
p-value of 
Wilcoxon test 
(2)>(1)
Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Median (1)  Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Median (2)
ExcessReturn -0.017 0.403 -0.027 0.041 0.427 0.010 0.0001 
ΔC 0.011 0.163 0.002 0.010 0.177 0.000 0.1521 
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Decreased Ownership Concentration 
(ΔH5D = 0)
(N=6,067)
Increased Ownership Concentration 
(ΔH5D = 1)
(N=2,420)
p-value of 
Wilcoxon test 
(2)>(1)
Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Median (1)  Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Median (2)
ΔD 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.5294 
ΔE 0.014 0.261 0.003 0.020 0.155 0.006 0.0001 
ΔNA 0.125 0.418 0.077 0.175 0.645 0.086 0.0110 
ΔI 0.003 0.020 0.001 0.003 0.019 0.001 0.9983 
LagC 0.226 0.229 0.157 0.230 0.239 0.166 0.0538 
StockD 0.002 0.012 0.000 0.002 0.012 0.000 0.9733 
Lev 0.250 0.189 0.215 0.237 0.183 0.202 0.0063 
NF 0.088 0.446 0.050 0.109 0.501 0.052 0.7195 
CA 0.153 0.114 0.127 0.155 0.115 0.126 0.5168 
ΔH5 -0.024 0.047 0.000 0.009 0.035 0.000 0.0001 
Q 1.6264 27.084 1.014 1.235 1.638 0.992 0.0022 
Panel A presents the statistics of the full sample. The median excess return relative to 
the market benchmark does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between ﬁrms with private and non-
private ultimate ownership control, although there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between 
the two types of ﬁrms in the change in cash holdings and interest expenses. Although 
the ﬁrms controlled by private owners (0.256) have more debt than their non-privately 
owned counterparts (0.199), the degree of net ﬁnancing is signiﬁcantly lower among 
the former than the latter. In addition, private ownership-controlled ﬁrms (0.112) hold 
fewer assets in cash and cash equivalents than the non-private ownership-controlled 
ﬁrms (0.130). Pinkowitz et al. (2006) investigate the value of cash and dividends in 35 
countries, but do not include China. Even though the ratio of cash dividends to total 
assets is higher in China than in the US or Japan, it is lower than that in many other 
countries. However, the ratio of cash holdings to total assets in China (0.153; Panel A) is 
higher than that in almost all countries except Japan. 
Panel B shows the statistics for ﬁrms with and without private ultimate control, based 
on Private, and Panel C those for ﬁrms with and without state ultimate control, based on 
State. Relative to non-private ﬁrms, private ﬁrms have better investment opportunities 
and, on average, fewer cash dividends. Moreover, on average, non-private firms are 
more likely to experience increasing ownership concentration than private ﬁrms, which 
implies that the former are more likely than the latter to expropriate private beneﬁts at 
investors’ expense. In other words, given the fewer investment opportunities, more cash 
holdings, greater change in cash holdings, more cash dividends, and greater incentives 
for expropriation, these statistics imply that the controlling investors of Chinese listed 
ﬁrms, especially non-private ﬁrms, are more likely to extract private beneﬁts from the 
ﬁrms’ cash holdings and cash dividends, which is consistent with the expectations of this 
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study. Similar results are obtained when State is used to distinguish the sample.
Panel D presents the statistics for firms experiencing an increased or decreased 
ownership concentration, based on ΔH5. Although firms experiencing a decreased 
ownership concentration have a significantly lower level of excess returns than those 
experiencing an increased ownership concentration, the former have more investment 
opportunities. In addition, although there are no significant differences between the 
ﬁrms in the change in cash holdings, change in cash dividends, or level of cash holdings, 
those with an increased ownership concentration are more likely to be state-controlled 
ﬁrms and to have owners with more incentives to expropriate beneﬁts from the ﬁrm.
4. Empirical Results
Table 2 provides the estimations of equation (1), which are examined for the two 
subsamples based on the three proxies of ownership control: private ownership versus 
non-private ownership in panel A, state ownership versus non-state ownership in panel 
B, and increased ownership concentration versus decreased ownership concentration in 
Panel C. 
Table 2. Changes in Value of Cash and Ownership Control
This table presents the results of tests to determine whether the change in the value of cash is subject to ownership control. 
Three proxies of ownership control are used: private ownership in panel A, state ownership in panel B, and the change in 
ownership concentration (ΔH5D) in panel C. ExcessReturn is the stock return of a ﬁrm less its benchmark return; ΔC is 
the change in cash holdings; ΔD is the change in cash dividends; ΔE is the change in earnings before interest and taxes 
plus interest; ΔNA is the change in total assets net of cash and cash equivalents; ΔI is the change in interest expenses; 
LagC is the level of cash holdings at the beginning of the year; StockD is stock dividends; and Lev is leverage; NF is net 
ﬁnancing in the year. All variables are deﬂated by the market value of beginning equity to control for heteroskedasticity. 
***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Panel A: Private ownership control (Private)
Dependent Var. 
=ExcessReturn(t)
Private = 0 Private = 1 t-stat of 
Diﬀerencecoeﬀ. std. err. p-value coeﬀ. std. err. p-value
Intercep(t) -0.058 0.014 <.0001 0.080 0.046 0.087 -2.8504 ***
ΔC 0.493 0.049 <.0001 0.717 0.126 <.0001 -1.6533 **
ΔD 0.498 0.189 0.009 1.093 0.558 0.050 -1.0108 
ΔE 0.247 0.027 <.0001 0.029 0.030 0.334 5.4181 ***
ΔNA 0.070 0.014 <.0001 0.132 0.024 <.0001 -2.2418 **
ΔI 0.141 0.281 0.617 -0.712 0.404 0.078 1.7331 **
LagC 0.287 0.023 <.0001 0.247 0.054 <.0001 0.6819 
StockD 0.857 0.408 0.036 0.221 0.771 0.774 0.7297 
Lev -0.173 0.028 <.0001 -0.340 0.062 <.0001 2.4615 ***
NF 0.038 0.016 0.015 0.026 0.025 0.298 0.3890 
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Dependent Var. 
=ExcessReturn(t)
Private = 0 Private = 1 t-stat of 
Diﬀerencecoeﬀ. std. err. p-value coeﬀ. std. err. p-value
C*ΔC -0.067 0.042 0.113 -0.409 0.119 0.001 2.6991 ***
Lev*ΔC -0.556 0.139 <.0001 -0.474 0.271 0.081 -0.2699 
R-sq 7.43% 10.07%
Panel B: State ownership control (State)
Dependent Var. 
=ExcessReturn(t)
State = 1 State = 0 t-stat of 
Diﬀerencecoeﬀ. State = 1 p-value coeﬀ. State = 0 p-value
Intercep(t) -0.047 0.014 0.001 -0.023 0.033 0.483 -0.649 
ΔC 0.485 0.051 <.0001 0.730 0.111 <.0001 -2.006 **
ΔD 0.542 0.194 0.005 0.809 0.494 0.101 -0.504 
ΔE 0.248 0.027 <.0001 0.029 0.028 0.299 5.594 ***
ΔNA 0.075 0.015 <.0001 0.126 0.021 <.0001 -1.932 **
ΔI 0.217 0.288 0.452 -0.758 0.377 0.045 2.054 **
LagC 0.293 0.024 <.0001 0.218 0.049 <.0001 1.383 *
StockD 0.951 0.421 0.024 0.144 0.700 0.837 0.987 
Lev -0.180 0.029 <.0001 -0.297 0.054 <.0001 1.891 **
NF 0.029 0.017 0.090 0.040 0.022 0.068 -0.404 
C*ΔC -0.068 0.043 0.118 -0.436 0.111 <.0001 3.088 ***
Lev*ΔC -0.533 0.142 0.000 -0.501 0.248 0.043 -0.111 
R-sq 7.43% 10.07%
Panel C: Change in ownership concentration (ΔH5D)
Dependent Var. 
=ExcessReturn(t)
Decreased Ownership 
Concentration
Increased Ownership
Concentration t-stat of 
Diﬀerencecoeﬀ. Std. err. p-value coeﬀ. std. err. p-value
Intercep(t) -0.077 0.015 <.0001 0.045 0.027 0.088 -3.972 ***
dL(t) 0.623 0.063 <.0001 0.289 0.079 0.000 3.293 ***
dCashD(t) 0.648 0.210 0.002 0.265 0.376 0.482 0.888 
dE(t) 0.110 0.020 <.0001 0.355 0.056 <.0001 -4.128 ***
dNA(t) 0.092 0.015 <.0001 0.039 0.022 0.081 1.980 **
dI(t) 0.023 0.257 0.928 -1.177 0.466 0.012 2.256 **
L(t-1) 0.301 0.025 <.0001 0.262 0.040 <.0001 0.837 
StockD(t) 0.677 0.414 0.102 0.741 0.708 0.295 -0.077 
Lev(t) -0.189 0.030 <.0001 -0.242 0.050 <.0001 0.906 
NF(t) 0.003 0.015 0.835 0.156 0.028 <.0001 -4.774 ***
L(t)_dL(t) -0.115 0.067 0.087 -0.113 0.057 0.047 -0.025 
Lev(t)_dL(t) -0.623 0.143 <.0001 -0.333 0.234 0.155 -1.061 
R-sq 6.68% 10.98%
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In all three panels, the coeﬃcients of cash holdings are signiﬁcantly higher in ﬁrms 
with less likelihood of expropriation (ie, private firms, non-state firms, and firms 
experiencing a decreased ownership concentration) than in those with greater such 
likelihood. This ﬁnding indicates that investors place a higher value on the cash holdings 
of firms with private ultimate control, non-state ultimate control, and a decreased 
ownership concentration (ie, a higher level of investor protection) than on those of ﬁrms 
with non-private ultimate control, state ultimate control, and an increased ownership 
concentration. Although investors value the cash dividends of ﬁrms with private ultimate 
control, non-state ultimate control, and a decreased ownership concentration more 
highly, the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant, thus providing weak support for the tunneling 
hypothesis. In addition, the results in the three panels also show that cash dividends 
make a greater contribution to ﬁrm value in ﬁrms with private ultimate control, non-
state ownership control, and a decreased ownership concentration, which is inconsistent 
with the ﬁndings in the literature (Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 
2007). This evidence raises the question: is it possible that the two hypotheses each 
dominate for diﬀerent types of ﬁrms?
    While the results in Table 2 are in favor of the tunneling hypothesis, one particular 
phenomenon in Chinese listed firms is that firms need to pay dividends in order to 
acquire extra funds from the capital market. It is likely that cash payouts are not only a 
means of reducing agency costs, but also a means of obtaining more funds in future. An 
unreported correlation test conﬁrms this phenomenon, ﬁnding that cash holdings and 
cash dividends are signiﬁcantly and positively related. Recall the results in Table 1: ﬁrms 
with private ultimate control, non-state ultimate control, and a decreased ownership 
concentration have more investment opportunities, and thus they need to raise more 
funds to pursue these opportunities. As the cash in firms with more investment 
opportunities should be invested in such positive net present value (NPV) projects, and 
as the beneﬁts from these projects may be better than those from expropriation, it is 
likely that these ﬁrms have fewer incentives to engage in expropriation at the expense of 
other investors. In sum, the need for funds, the beneﬁts arising from expropriation, and 
the expropriation incentives of ﬁrms with diﬀerent ownership structures and at diﬀerent 
growth stages may be diﬀerent. In other words, cash holdings and cash dividends may 
play different roles in different types of firms, and thus the dominance of the two 
hypotheses may diﬀer under certain conditions. Accordingly, this study further considers 
ownership structure, growth stage, and the level of cash holdings to investigate whether 
the dominance of the free cash flow hypothesis or tunneling hypothesis is related to 
diﬀerences in ﬁrms’ growth opportunities.
Table 3. Changes in Value of Cash, Cash Dividends, Growth, and Ownership Control
This table shows the results of tests of whether the change in the value of cash is subject to ownership control and 
investment opportunities. The variables are defined in the same way as those in Tables 1 and 2, and the subgroup 
classification is based on the directions of the change in ownership concentration (ΔH5D), the median value of 
investment opportunities (Q), and the type of ultimate controller (Private or State). ***, **, and * represent statistical 
signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Panel A: Change in ownership concentration versus private ultimate control
Dependent 
Variable 
ExcessReturn
Decreased Ownership 
Concentration
Increased Ownership 
Concentration t-stat of
Diﬀerencecoeﬀ. Std. err. p-value coeﬀ. Std. err. p-value
Private=0
ΔC 0.581 0.074 <.0001 0.353 0.077 <.0001 2.139 **
ΔD 0.473 0.220 0.032 0.325 0.373 0.383 0.341 
Private=1
ΔC 0.733 0.130 <.0001 0.773 0.364 0.034 -0.104 
ΔD 1.653 0.607 0.007 -0.443 1.243 0.722 1.515 *
t-stat of Diﬀerence
ΔC -1.021 -1.128 -0.519 
ΔD -1.828 ** 0.592 0.725 
Panel B: Change in ownership concentration versus state ultimate control
Dependent 
Variable 
ExcessReturn
Decreased Ownership 
Concentration
Increased Ownership 
Concentration t-stat of
Diﬀerencecoeﬀ. Std. err. p-value coeﬀ. Std. err. p-value
State=1
ΔC 0.597 0.076 <.0001 0.317 0.079 <.0001 2.554 ***
ΔD 0.509 0.226 0.024 0.364 0.382 0.341 0.326 
State=0
ΔC 0.684 0.117 <.0001 0.969 0.298 0.001 -0.892 
ΔD 1.317 0.541 0.015 -0.618 1.071 0.564 1.613 *
t-stat of Diﬀerence
ΔC -0.617 -2.115 ** -1.208 
ΔD -1.379 * 0.864 1.029 
Panel C: Change in ownership concentration versus investment opportunities
Dependent 
Variable 
ExcessReturn
Decreased Ownership 
Concentration
Increased Ownership 
Concentration t-stat of
Diﬀerencecoeﬀ. Std. err. p-value coeﬀ. Std. err. p-value
Low Q
ΔC 0.166 0.063 0.008 0.111 0.060 0.066 0.635 
ΔD 0.208 0.159 0.190 0.766 0.277 0.006 -1.744 **
High Q
ΔC 0.795 0.107 <.0001 0.645 0.179 0.000 0.721 
ΔD 1.610 0.455 0.000 -0.850 0.800 0.288 2.674 ***
t-stat of Diﬀerence
ΔC -5.084 *** -2.831 *** -2.527 ***
ΔD -2.910 *** 1.909 ** 1.298 *
Table 3 presents the regression estimations for firms with different expropriation 
incentives and possibilities by considering two of the three factors of change in 
ownership concentration, ultimate control, and investment opportunities. All of the 
observations in Panel A are classiﬁed into four groups based on the change in ownership 
concentration and private ultimate control. In the group with non-private ultimate 
control and a decreased ownership concentration, cash holdings and cash dividends 
are valued more highly than they are in firms with non-private ultimate control but 
an increased ownership concentration. In addition, investors place greater value on 
the cash dividends of firms with private ultimate control and a decreased ownership 
concentration than on those of firms with private ultimate control but an increased 
ownership concentration. These findings reflect investors’ greater discounting of the 
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cash holdings and cash dividends of ﬁrms with a higher probability of expropriation or 
stronger incentives to expropriate, which is consistent with the tunneling hypothesis. 
Moreover, cash dividends have the highest value in the group of firms with private 
ultimate control and a decreased ownership concentration. This ﬁnding provides further 
support for the tunneling hypothesis in that these ﬁrms have the fewest incentives to 
obtain beneﬁts at the expense of investors, and thus investors will not consider their cash 
payouts a means of expropriation. The four subsamples in Panel B are deﬁned based on 
the change in ownership concentration and state ultimate control, and the results are 
similar to those in Panel A, thus indicating that the results remain consistent in both 
proxies of the probability of asset expropriation and further strengthening the credibility 
of this study’s empirical analyses.
The subsamples in Panel C are distinguished by a change in ownership concentration 
and investment opportunities. Although there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the value 
of cash holdings between firms with few investment opportunities and an increased 
ownership concentration and those with few investment opportunities and a decreased 
ownership concentration, investors tend to value the cash dividends of the former 
more highly than those of the latter. According to the free cash ﬂow hypothesis, ﬁrms 
with fewer investment opportunities have more free cash ﬂow problems, and thus cash 
payouts can mitigate the agency problems between investors and ﬁrms. In other words, 
investors place greater value on the cash dividends of ﬁrms with a greater likelihood of 
expropriation (eg, an increased ownership concentration). Thus, the results show that 
the free cash ﬂow hypothesis dominates in ﬁrms with fewer investment opportunities, 
which demonstrates that investment opportunity is a key issue in determining which 
hypothesis is dominant. 
The results also show that regardless of the likelihood of expropriation (ie, no matter 
whether there is a positive or negative change in ownership concentration), investors 
value the cash holdings of ﬁrms with more investment opportunities more highly than 
those of ﬁrms with fewer investment opportunities. This is because cash holdings are 
more important in allowing the former to fund investment projects. Moreover, the 
results also show that among ﬁrms with more investment opportunities, investors place 
greater value on the cash dividends of those with less likelihood of expropriation (ie, a 
decreased ownership concentration) and punish those with a greater such likelihood that 
pay out cash dividends. One explanation for this ﬁnding is that investors consider the 
cash payouts in the latter type of ﬁrms to be a means of expropriation. Another possible 
reason is that investors believe that ﬁrms with more investment opportunities should not 
pay out cash dividends, but rather should invest money in projects. However, among 
the four subsamples, investors place the highest value on the cash dividends of ﬁrms 
with more investment opportunities and a decreased ownership concentration, which 
implies that as long as ﬁrms have little likelihood of expropriation and bright prospects, 
investors consider cash payouts to be an evidence of good performance. This ﬁnding is 
also consistent with the aforementioned special phenomenon of China’s capital market, 
that is, that the country’s ﬁrms need to pay out cash dividends to raise funds from extra 
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equity issuance. In sum, the free cash ﬂow hypothesis is dominant in ﬁrms with fewer 
investment opportunities, which is consistent with our expectation; hence, investment 
opportunities should be taken into account when researchers attempt to distinguish 
which of the two hypotheses dominates the other.
The results in Table 3 indicate that the value of a firm’s cash holdings and cash 
dividends is subject to the factors of ownership concentration, ultimate control, and 
investment opportunities. When ﬁrms have fewer investment opportunities, investors 
value the cash dividends of those with a greater probability of expropriation more highly, 
consistent with the free cash ﬂow hypothesis. In addition, investors place the highest 
value on the cash dividends of ﬁrms under private or non-state ultimate control and 
those with more investment opportunities when these firms have little likelihood of 
expropriation in these ﬁrms are low (ie, a decreased ownership concentration). According 
to the free cash ﬂow hypothesis, the agency problem is more severe in ﬁrms with few 
investment opportunities but large cash holdings, which implies that cash holdings may 
inﬂuence the likelihood of or incentives for expropriation. Table 3 considers only two of 
the three factors of interest in each panel. Thus, we now turn to further analysis of the 
value of cash holdings and cash dividends in two matrices: (1) ownership concentration, 
ultimate control, and investment opportunities, and (2) ownership concentration, 
investment opportunities, and the level of cash holdings.
 
Table 4. Changes in Value of Cash, Cash Dividends, and Ownership Control
This table shows the results of tests of whether the change in the value of cash is subject to ownership control, ultimate 
control, investment opportunities and the level of cash holdings. The variables are deﬁned in the same way as those in 
Tables 1 and 2, and the subgroups classiﬁcation is based on the directions of the change in ownership concentration 
(ΔH5D), the median value of investment opportunities (Q), the type of ultimate controller (Private or State), and the 
median value of cash holdings. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Panel A: Change in ownership concentration, private ultimate control, and investment opportunities
Dependent Variable 
ExcessReturn
Decreased Ownership 
Concentration
Increased Ownership 
Concentration t-stat of
Diﬀerence
coeﬀ. Std. err. p-value coeﬀ. Std. err. p-value
Low Q
Private=0
ΔC 0.156 0.075 0.038 0.172 0.064 0.007 -0.158 
ΔD 0.180 0.172 0.296 0.887 0.298 0.003 -2.056 **
Private=1
ΔC 0.260 0.113 0.022 -0.337 0.234 0.152 2.295 **
ΔD 0.564 0.412 0.172 0.399 0.772 0.606 0.188 
t-stat of Diﬀerence
ΔC -0.762 2.097 ** 2.006 **
ΔD -0.861 0.589 -0.277 
High Q
Private=0
ΔC 0.795 0.128 <.0001 0.547 0.174 0.002 1.145 
ΔD 1.095 0.480 0.023 -0.999 0.816 0.221 2.211 **
Private=1
ΔC 0.918 0.217 <.0001 1.487 0.676 0.029 -0.801 
ΔD 3.434 1.313 0.009 -0.751 2.247 0.739 1.608 *
t-stat of Diﬀerence
ΔC -0.489 -1.346 * -1.006 
ΔD -1.673 ** -0.104 0.804 
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Panel B: Change in ownership concentration, state ultimate control, and investment opportunities
Dependent Variable 
ExcessReturn
Decreased Ownership 
Concentration
Increased Ownership 
Concentration t-stat of
Diﬀerence
coeﬀ. Std. err. p-value coeﬀ. Std. err. p-value
Low Q
State=1
ΔC 0.173 0.078 0.026 0.175 0.066 0.008 -0.016 
ΔD 0.178 0.175 0.309 0.897 0.306 0.004 -2.036 **
State=0
ΔC 0.207 0.104 0.047 -0.274 0.199 0.171 2.140 **
ΔD 0.505 0.379 0.183 0.351 0.661 0.596 0.202 
t-stat of Diﬀerence
ΔC -0.259 2.139 ** 2.090 **
ΔD -0.782 0.749 -0.252 
High Q
State=1
ΔC 0.830 0.134 <.0001 0.427 0.181 0.018 1.790 **
ΔD 1.201 0.498 0.016 -0.798 0.841 0.343 2.044 **
State=0
ΔC 0.899 0.190 <.0001 1.757 0.520 0.001 -1.550 *
ΔD 2.467 1.113 0.027 -1.350 1.930 0.485 1.713 **
t-stat of Diﬀerence
ΔC -0.292 -2.415 *** -1.725 **
ΔD -1.038 0.262 1.280 
Panel C: Change in ownership concentration, investment opportunities, and the level of cash holdings
Dependent Variable 
ExcessReturn
Decreased Ownership 
Concentration
Increased Ownership 
Concentration t-stat of
Diﬀerence
coeﬀ. Std. err. p-value coeﬀ. Std. err. p-value
Low CA
Low Q
ΔC 0.567 0.138 <.0001 0.087 0.253 0.731 1.667 **
ΔD 0.339 0.220 0.123 0.765 0.439 0.082 -0.868 
High 
ΔC 1.747 0.307 <.0001 2.847 0.499 <.0001 -1.879 **
ΔD 3.677 0.601 <.0001 1.011 1.216 0.406 1.966 **
t-stat of Diﬀerence
ΔC -3.504 *** -4.939 *** -4.407 ***
ΔD -5.216 *** -0.190 -0.544 
High CA
Low Q
ΔC 0.267 0.074 0.000 0.213 0.064 0.001 0.548 
ΔD 0.115 0.225 0.608 0.744 0.345 0.031 -1.528 *
High Q
ΔC 1.111 0.128 <.0001 0.758 0.213 0.000 1.423 *
ΔD -0.360 0.647 0.578 -2.230 0.996 0.026 1.573 *
t-stat of Diﬀerence
ΔC -5.714 *** -2.448 *** -2.177 **
ΔD 0.694 2.820 *** 2.296 ***
Table 4 shows the results with the change in ownership concentration, ultimate 
control, investment opportunities, and the level of cash holdings considered 
simultaneously. As can be seen from Panel A, among firms with fewer investment 
opportunities and non-private ultimate control, investors value the cash dividends of 
those experiencing an increased ownership concentration more highly than those of not 
experiencing such an increase. Because these ﬁrms have less need for cash holdings to 
fund investment projects, the agency problem becomes more severe when they hold a 
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high level of cash, which is consistent with the free cash ﬂow hypothesis. Among ﬁrms 
with fewer investment opportunities but private ultimate control, in contrast, investors 
place less value on the cash holdings of those experiencing an increased ownership 
concentration, as these ﬁrms are more likely to appropriate fund for their owners’ private 
beneﬁt. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in cash dividends between the two subsamples.
Among ﬁrms with more investment opportunities, investors place more value on the 
cash dividends of those experiencing a decreased ownership concentration, especially 
those under private ultimate control. This is because these ﬁrms have a lower likelihood 
of expropriation and need to pay out cash dividends to raise funds through extra equity 
issuance, consistent with the aforementioned special phenomenon in China. These 
ﬁndings show that when ﬁrms have more investment opportunities, neither hypothesis 
is necessarily applicable in explaining the payout policy, which again highlights the 
importance of investment opportunities. Panel B shows similar results, thus further 
conﬁrming the ﬁndings presented thus far.
Panel C shows the results of simultaneously taking into account a change in 
ownership concentration, investment opportunities, and the level of cash holdings. 
Among firms with fewer investment opportunities, regardless of the level of cash 
holdings, investors place less value on cash holdings and more value on cash dividends 
when those ﬁrms have a higher probability of expropriation (ie, an increased ownership 
concentration), which is consistent with the free cash ﬂow hypothesis that ﬁrms with few 
investment opportunities but a high level of cash holdings are more likely to suﬀer from 
the free cash ﬂow problem, and thus cash dividends can alleviate the agency problem. 
Moreover, among ﬁrms with more investment opportunities, investors value the cash 
dividends of those experiencing a decreased ownership concentration more highly, 
especially if these ﬁrms have a low level of cash. There are three potential reasons for this 
ﬁnding: (1) the need to pay out cash dividends to obtain funds for investment projects is 
greater in these ﬁrms; (2) there is little opportunity for these ﬁrms to expropriate, as they 
have a low level of cash; and (3) these ﬁrms are in the growth stage, and investors thus 
believe that they have bright prospects.
To sum up, investors are indeed concerned with cash holdings and cash dividends, 
especially when firms are more likely to engage in expropriation, and it seems that 
the free cash ﬂow hypothesis dominates the tunneling hypothesis in ﬁrms with fewer 
investment opportunities. Consistent with the special phenomenon in China’s capital 
markets, investors place greater value on the cash dividends of firms with more 
investment opportunities, as it is reasonable to expect that these ﬁrms will pay out cash 
dividends to raise funds to support their investment projects. 
5. Conclusions
The value of Chinese listed firms is evidenced herein to be inversely related to 
ownership concentration and control, because controlling shareholders have diﬀerent 
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objectives than minority shareholders, and the former are likely to appropriate funds for 
their own private beneﬁt at the expense of the latter. An important issue is determining 
how these controlling shareholders harm ﬁrm vale and minority shareholder interests. 
In addition to its discussion of asset tunneling via related party transactions, the 
literature proposes that a high level of cash dividends provides the holders of non-
tradable shares, especially the state, with the opportunity to gain high returns. However, 
although oﬀering large cash payouts may result in fewer internal funds for investment 
opportunities, these firms still have access to external financing due to preferential 
treatment from the state.
One essential condition for the argument that large cash dividend payouts are a 
means of expropriation to hold true is that investors would enjoy greater returns if ﬁrms 
paid smaller dividends. This study thus examines the association between ownership 
control and the value of cash holdings and dividends. When the degree of ownership 
control is high, there are more likely to be conﬂicts of interest between the controlling 
shareholders and outside shareholders. Thus, outside shareholders will value cash 
dividends more highly if the free cash ﬂow hypothesis is dominant. If, however, cash 
dividends provide a means of asset tunneling, then investors will place less value on the 
cash dividends of ﬁrms with a higher degree of ownership control. 
The results presented herein are rather more consistent with the free cash flow 
hypothesis than the tunneling hypothesis. Investors place the greatest value on the 
cash holdings of firms with a lower level of ownership control, private or non-state 
ultimate control, and more investment opportunities. These ﬁndings indicate that when 
shareholders are free of concerns over being expropriated, they prefer ﬁrms to hold more 
cash to pursue investment opportunities. In addition, investors value the cash dividends 
of ﬁrms with strong ownership concentration and fewer investment opportunities more 
highly, consistent with the free cash ﬂow hypothesis. However, among ﬁrms with more 
investment opportunities, investors value the cash dividends of those with a decreased 
ownership concentration more highly. These ﬁndings suggest that if shareholders are free 
of concerns of being expropriated, they will accept ﬁrms’ payouts of dividends to raise 
funds to support investment projects, which is again consistent with the aforementioned 
special phenomenon of capital markets in China.
This study contributes to the literature on agency theory and international corporate 
governance. By investigating the value of cash holdings and cash dividends for ﬁrms 
with high and low degree of ownership control, this study helps to resolve the dispute 
over the role played by cash dividends in asset expropriation on the part of controlling 
shareholders in Chinese listed ﬁrms. Its ﬁndings show that investors are concerned about 
the cash holdings and cash dividends that the controlling shareholders of state-controlled 
firms may extract from company assets for their own private benefit. The study also 
contributes to the literature on cash holdings. In a rapidly growing economy, Chinese 
listed ﬁrms have large capital demands to support their growth, and the most essential 
condition for these ﬁrms to be able to hold a high level of cash holdings is the quality 
of investor protection. The results of this study consistently support the free cash ﬂow 
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hypothesis of agency theory in explaining the cash holdings and cash dividend payouts 
of Chinese listed ﬁrms. They also serve as an example of the applicability of Anglo-Saxon 
theory to emerging markets.
The foundation of this study is the idea in the literature that investors in growing 
ﬁrms in countries with poor investor protection prefer more cash dividends and less cash 
holdings. With reference to prior evidence of a negative relationship between ownership 
control and ﬁrm value, this study follows most of the literature and considers the high 
degree of ownership control in China to be an indication of poor investor protection. 
However, there may be other indicators by which to identify the quality of such 
protection in examining this topic, which we leave to future research. Nevertheless, the 
empirical analyses presented herein are largely consistent with the literature, which serves 
to ensure the validity of the study’s ﬁndings.
These ﬁndings have a number of practical implications. For example, in a growing 
economy, a higher level of cash holdings may be reasonable, as most firms enjoy a 
number of investment opportunities. Nevertheless, determining whether this higher 
level of cash holdings relative to comparable markets really results in better future 
performance merits further investigation. In addition, although large cash payouts do 
not necessarily mean the interests of minority shareholders are being expropriated, 
shareholders remain concerned over such payouts as they may result in the loss of good 
growth opportunities or an increase in the need for external financing. Even though 
the state may oﬀer special ﬁnancing treatment to ﬁrms in certain strategic industries, 
external ﬁnancing still increases the cost of capital, and thus reduces the opportunities 
for high-return investments. Therefore, changing the corporate ownership structure or 
the rules of ownership control may be a necessary step for policy makers in emerging 
countries such as China if they wish to attract more investors and further develop 
their ﬁnancial market. Further, company insiders may ﬁnd that improving corporate 
governance to enhance investor protection boosts ﬁrm value, thus lowering the cost of 
capital and increasing the likelihood of future low-cost external ﬁnancing.
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